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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. By Edwin Borchard. Cleveland: Banks-Baldwin Law
Publishing Co. 1934. pp. :vdi, 669.
Reviewed by Walter F. Doddt
PRoFEssoR Borchard's volume comes at a peculiarly opportune time. The movement
for declaratory judgments in this country owes its success primarily to the ability
and persistence of the author of this volume, and the essential step toward the
general adoption of this important procedural device-the enactment of a federal
declaratory judgments act--came while the volume was in press. Although the
approval of the federal act did not take place until June 14, 1934, the aspects of the
problem in the federal courts are sufficiently considered in the present volume.
The controversy with respect to the power of Congress to provide for declaratory
judgments is still to some extent reflected in the tone of the author's discussion
of this matter, but this may be readily excused in view of the author's success in
obtaining the approval of his position by the United States Supreme Court and by
Congress. In Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,1 the United
States Supreme Court has taken a broad and intelligent view as to what constitutes a
"case" or "controversy," and it is to be trusted that no future restriction of this
view will limit the use of declaratory judgments under the recent act of Congress.
The writer of this review practices in a state which has -not adopted a declaratory
judgment statute but which permits what are in fact declaratory judgments in the
construction of wills and in proceedings to quiet title. Illinois has recently taken
important steps toward the simplification of judicial procedure, and the publication
of Professor Borchard's volume, together with the adoption of the federal act, Vll,
it is believed, have an important share in bringing Illinois and other states into line
with the federal government, and with the thirty-four states and territories that have
adopted the declaratory judgment procedure.
The volume under review is much more than a mere analysis of American statutes
and of American practice under such statutes. The chapter on history and com-
parative law presents the first adequate discussion of the declaratory judgment in
other countries, and furnishes an important background for future guidance in the
application of a relatively new procedural device in this country. The thorough
analysis of the purposes for which declaratory judgments may be used will be of
distinct value to the practitioner. Yet, since the author has given us so much, it
may be suggested that the practitioner needs to apply the declaratory judgment to
specific cases in a single jurisdiction. To him it would have been of aid, even though
involving repetition, if the author had analysed the experience of a single jurisdiction,
as Professor Borchard had previously done in an article limited to Pennsylvania.
The practitioner also needs aid in formulating pleadings under a new procedural
device, and while the chapter on procedure and practice tells him what he may do,
it would have been of value had the author included some forms of typical prayers
for relief where a declaratory judgment is sought.
With respect to the use of declaratory judgments as a means of raising constitu-
tional issues, the author may properly have argued2 that little change is made in
1 Chicago, Illinois. Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. 288 U. S. 249 (1933). 2. Pp. 301-303.
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practice. Ever since the stipulation in Hylton v. United States,3 that Hylton kept
one hundred and twenty-five chariots "exclusively for the Defendant's own private
use and not to let out to hire", constitutional questions not involving complicated
issues of fact have largely been determined in "made cases", and it is not material
whether the issue be raised by injunction, declaratory judgment or otherwise. This
is recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. v. Wallace.1
To the present reviewer the most promising thing about Professor Borchard's
volume and about the services of Professor Borchard in stimulating an important
procedural advance, is the demonstration that law school teachers may actually
accomplish something to help solve the problems of our legal system. A new and
independent profession of law school teaching has arisen largely within our generation,
and this profession has attracted a number of persons who have the ability and time
to aid in legal progress. Yet this profession has as yet done little or nothing to
counteract the declining public respect for the lawyer-whether in teaching or in
practice. Aside from Wigmore's work upon evidence, the profession of law school
teachers has contributed little in the way of leadership. Law schools have more and
more become adjuncts of business colleges and agencies of apprenticeship for big
corporate law firms, and have not fully recognized that the social aspects of the law
outweigh the law as an aid to organized business. The development has been one
toward finding the highest price for the law school product, and this tendency has
not been materially weakened by the influence of the present depression upon the
market.
The large amount of ability which is found in the field of law school teaching has
in recent years devoted itself primarily to two tasks: (1) The restatement of the
law, when perhaps a good portion of the restated law should, upon proper investiga-
tion, be abandoned. The restatement is of value as a basis for further progress, but
may promote stagnation rather than progress. In the field of criminal procedure
alone'has really constructive work yet been done. (2) A large and growing mass
of literature has been produced by the law schools in support of the so-called
"realistic" approach to the study of the law; whereas the energy devoted to the
production of this literature, if applied in part to the types of investigation necessary
to determine the facts as to procedural and substantive law, would have aided in a
progressive improvement of our legal system.
In the most active period of our legal development and with a profession that
may devote ability and time to the actual problems of the law, we may, perhaps,
hope that the future offers more than the past has produced, and that persons like
Professor Borchard will undertake and accomplish much in aid of legal progresst
Professor Borchard has shown that such accomplishment is possible.
Reviewed by Robert von Moschziskert
THa Bar as a whole is probably the most conservative body to be found in America,
and lawyers are set traditionally against changes in practice. They like old ways of
doing things and are not prone to take up, new ways, or even to approve the ex-
tension of old ways if labeled as new; knowing this, Edwin Borchard's efforts to
establish the declaratory judgment in the United States command our admiration.
Commencing, years ago, with an article published in the Yale Law Journal, Pro-
fessor Borchard's good work in teaching his professional brothers just what the
3. 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796).
tPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania. Former Chief Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
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declaratory judgment is, and where applicable, has culminated in a recently pub-
lished volume, entitled Declaratory Judgments.
The preface to this interesting book denotes the author's mission, to demonstrate
that in the declaratory judgment will be found a means to serve society by ascertain-
ing and adjudicating the legal rights of contending parties before a wrongful move
on the part of any of them, beyond the assertion of the right in question or the
threat to carry it into effect, has taken place; that through the declaratory judgment
innumerable issues may be determined which are not susceptible of adjudication under
old forms. Professor Borchard's preface indicates also an intention, which he later
on amply fulfills, to show that the idea of the declaratory judgment is not a new
one, but merely the extension into more universal use of a long-existing form of
procedure, which had its roots in the Middle Ages and had been used extensively
elsewhere before its limited adoption in this country.
The difficulty in winning general recognition for declaratory judgment procedure
was that, in the words of our author, it required "a broadening of the conception of
'cause of action! and of the view that the judicial process is merely a means of
redress for committed wrongs"; it required also "an appreciation of the fact that
harm is done and rights are jeopardized by mere dispute or challenge without any
physical attack," and of the thought that "the mere existence of a cloud, the denial
of a right, the assertion of an unfounded claim, the existence of conflicting claims,
the uncertainty or insecurity occasioned by new events" properly "may constitute
operative facts" sufficient in themselves to create a right of action. All of which is
shown in this book.
The author also demonstrates how necessary it was to rid the professional mind
of a rather common idea that a declaratory judgment was nothing more nor les
than an advisory opinion, and to establish the fact that it was a final binding
judgment between adverse parties, which determined conclusively their respective
rights. That these objectives have been accomplished, and how accomplished, is
shown by Professor Borchard.
He attacks the prevailing notion that the chief function of a court is to compel
people to do those things which the law requires of them, and shows that the
command to perform is collateral and incidental to the determination that there is
a duty to perform; that the adjudication, not the command, is the essence of judicial
power.
Borchard believes that the professional conception of the meaning of the term
"cause of action" has become so involved in description and definition that it may
be profitable to revise entirely our idea of what constitutes a cause of action. We
all can agree that the term "cause of action" has become greatly confused, and
perhaps too limited; further, that for purposes of declaratory judgment procedure
our ideas as to what constitutes a cause of action must be revised. Most active
practitioners feel that a more liberal attitude than some of our leading courts have
taken toward this form of procedure, its purposes and scope, is desirable; but, at the
same time, those of us who have had contact with the practical adminitration of
the law in the courts recognize that there must be some limitation on the right to
bring matters into court, or otherwise our tribunals would be swamped with efforts
to obtain judicial consideration of alleged points of law which really do not constitute
points of controversy between actual contestants. Hence, the very proper insistence
by most of the courts that in all declaratory judgment proceedings the record must
show either an "actual controversy" or the "ripening seeds" of one; in other words,
there must appear a controversy which is actually existing, or one which is imminent
and inevitable, between real contestants, all of whom are before the court, and
that, where the record shows no such controversy but only a desire to be instructed
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on the law, the ease is not one for declaratory judgment; this our author recognizes.
Professor Borchard, however, gives the impression of holding a view that the
declaratory judgment should supersede very generally other forms of procedure.
We may agree that the declaratory judgment has a useful place in the field of
preventive and curative justice and that this fact ought to be recognized by all,
but it seems to the present reviewer that, while the courts should be empowered to
apply in their discretion the declaratory judgment to any case where the essentials
for such relief are present, yet an attempt to force that remedy into the places
occupied by other set forms of procedure, in cases where the controversy between
the parties involved makes no special call for declaratory judgment and where the
controversy has reached a point at which an established remedy may be applied
equally well to it, would be a mistake; first, because such a course would meet with
opposition from the courts and, secondly, because it would be abandoning in too
large a measure old and well-sustained procedures, which have gained useful places
for themselves in our judicial system, in favor of a procedure concerning which
many novel points of practice are bound to arise for decision.
Lack of space will not allow one to epitomize or summarize the various chapters;
suffice it to say that they take up in due order all conceivable aspects of the
declaratory judgment and the practice which has grown up in connection with It.
The theory back of this form of procedure, its relations to other well-known forms,
its development in this and other countries, and the manner in which it fits into
and aids our established system are all shown in this useful book.
There is an Appendix giving the text of the Uniform Declaratory judgment Act
and of several other declaratory judgment statutes, as well as the report of the
United States Senate Committee on the subject, submitted on May 10, 1934, and
the full text of the recent Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The Appendix con-
tains likewise an alphabetically arranged list of the various state acts, with the
decisions thereunder, showing thirty-five American statutes in all, counting the
recent Federal Act.
This book is the last and most comprehensive work on the important subject of
declaratory judgments, and should be possessed for purposes of reference by all
law libraries and active practitioners; finally, it is written with Professor Borchard's
usual clarity, which makes it entertaining reading.
Reviewed by W. Ivor Jenningsf
IN ENGLAND the declaratory judgment is of respectable antiquity. In the Chancery
Division most proceedings begin with an originating summons and end with a
declaration. In the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, as Professor Borchard
points out, most decisions are necessarily declaratory. In the King's Bench Division
it is not used so much, partly because it was first imported from Scotland into equity
jurisdiction and the common law lawyers have taken some time to get used to it,
partly because some substantive remedy is much more frequently required at law
than in equity, and partly because common law pleaders frequently prefer to use
such remedies as the prerogative writs. A declaratory judgment may also be
obtained in a county court, though it does not appear that it is frequently used in
such courts. If proposals for extending county court jurisdiction, which are now
being placed before a Royal Commission, are accepted, it will clearly be of more
significance to the lower courts. In any case, it is an important and essential part
of English legal procedure.
tLondon, England. Reader in English Law in the University of London.
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Professor Borchard's contributions to legal periodicals had raised high anticipations
of his forthcoming book. Now that it is before us, we find that those anticipations
have been fully realised. It is not merely a study of an important branch of legal
procedure. It is also a comparative study which helps to indicate the kind of
contribution which modem jurisprudence can make to the solution of the practical
problems of legal administration. It draws upon the experience of a dozen or more
legal systems. For instance, in connection with "case or controversy" reference is
made to the federal constitutions of Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Brazil. Else-
where, much emphasis is laid upon Scottish, New Zealand, German and Austrian
decisions. In the historical chapter, the author goes even farther afield. One lesson
which he teaches indirectly is the vast range available for research in the several
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. It emphasizes the need stressed by the Atkin Committee
on Legal Education for some further coordination of Law Libraries in London. For
nowhere in England outside London is the literature available. And even if the
libraries of the four Inns of Court and of the London School of Economics were
coordinated, to follow up some of Professor Borchard's references would be
impossible.
The distinction which the author draws between declaratory judgments and ad-
visory opinions is of course necessary for American conditions, but it is rather
artificial when applied to England. Even the general declaration of legal principles,
as in McNaughton's Case,1 has considerable advantages. At certain stages in its
development through isolated decisions, the common law has fallen into an intolerable
confusion. The process of adding case to case produces chaos. It is appropriate
that judges should be asked to blaze a trail through the jungle that they have made.
Possibly such a step is less necessary now that a serious attempt is being made to
cut away the undergrowth by legislation. But even in respect of statute law a simple
answer to a simple question will sometimes avoid substantial delay and expense. The
Canadian Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have had
experience in the working of this system in the interpretation of the Canadian Consti-
tution. Judges sometimes object to the vagueness of the questions; but the legislator
is entitled to retort that nothing can be less precise than the principles elaborated in
the local prohibition and insurance cases. Also, the law lords turned out in force
and compelled the Government to withdraw clause 4 of the Rating and Valuation Bill
of 1928, which would have permitted the Minister of Health to put questions on
local taxation law to the High Court. No doubt the clause was too widely drafted,
but experience since 1928 has demonstrated that it was essential to an effective local
taxation system. One decision on sporting rights affected the taxation of 140,000
properties. On the "derating" legislation of 1928 and 1929 there has been a host
of decisions, and before these gave the law some elements of stability there was
hopeless confusion. The appeal in Moon v. London County Cotmcil- had to bh
expedited in order to get a simple answer to a simple question which was troubling
local taxation authorities.
Opinions on such general questions are of course different from declaratory judg-
ments in individual controversies. But the difference is more apparent than real.
If the Minister of Health states a case under the National Health Insurance Acts
or the audit provisions of the Local Government Acts, he is following exactly the
procedure adopted by inferior courts in cases stated, or by the parties under the
appropriate order. Each case is a "test' case, deliberately framed to get an opinion
on a specific point of law. Professor Borchard rightly remarks that every case
raising a point of law involves a declaratory judgment, whether or not a substantive
1935]
1. 10 CL & F. 200 (1843). 2. [19311 A. C. 151.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
remedy is also sought. An insurance company which takes a "running-down" case
to the House of Lords is not concerned with the damages; it is concerned with the
declaration of law. Much of the American argument on "case or controversy" seems
to me to be highly artificial.
Professor Borchard rightly stresses the importance of the declaratory judgment in
disputes with administrative authorities. In spite of recent legislative changes, it
is probable that England is still more highly "socialised" than most of the American
states. The tendencies point towards a substantial development of public services.
In the absence of a set of administrative tribunals, it is essential to make recourse
to the ordinary courts rapid and effective. Many recent statutes have created a
statutory modification of certiorari which is working well in respect of housing
schemes. But in the absence of such a special procedure, which theoretically quashes
the order but in substance declares the law, the ordinary action for a declaration is
the most effective remedy. I would, indeed, stress one application of the remedy
which Professor Borchard does not emphasise, perhaps because it has no application
to American conditions. Frequently the most effective substantive remedy is ad-
ninistrative action, such as a surcharge or disallowance of illegal expenditure by a
public officer. But in order to permit a taxpayer to accomplish this, it is necessary
to have the law decided by the courts. The taxpayer's remedy for this purpose, as
Attorney-General v. Merthyr Tydfil Union3 showed, is an action for a declaration.
I would not, however, give to Dyson v. Attorpey-General4 the emphasis which Pro-
fessor Borchard gives it, at least under English conditions. Owing to the limitations
of the law of proceedings against the Crown, the case is of strictly limited application
in England. If, however, the agitation for the reform of the law on this point
succeeds, its importance will greatly increase.
A review which considers only the importance of Professor Borchard's work for
English lawyers is necessarily one-sided. The enormous list of cases decided in
American jurisdictions during the past fifteen years suggests that new uses of the
declaratory judgment will be discovered by the American courts, and the future of
the Federal Act which the author did so much to secure is likely to be of absorbing
interest. It is to be hoped that Professor Borchard will follow up his study of the
declaratory judgment with an examination of other aspects of comparative legal
procedure.
UN PAIIRE DE JURISPRUDENCE COmPARATrVE. By Edouard Lambert. Paris: Marcel
Giard. 1934. pp. xl, 221.
PROFESSOR LAMBERT, a leading French scholar in the field of comparative law, pre-
sents in this "par~re" (opinion) a comparative examination which may interest
American readers both for its subject matter and for the manner in which it dis-
closes the personality of its author.
The opinion deals mainly with a controversy developing out of the depreciation
of the pound sterling. The commercial agency of the U. S. S. R. in Germany
bought commodities on credit, on a large scale, from German firms. Prices were
fixed in pounds sterling, and the Russians gave bills of exchange as security for
the indebtedness. After the depreciation of the pound, sellers and bllholders claimed
sums higher than the face amounts of the contracts and the bills in order to be
indemnified for the decrease in the value of the pound. The Russians, considering
these claims to be wholly unjustified, asked Professor Lambert for his opinion. The
author decides in favor of the Russians. His investigation rests primarily on Ger-
[Vol. 44
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man law, which governs the contracts, but he illumines his work by an application
of the comparative method, referring to French, Italian, Belgian and Anglo-American
law. Although the discussion of Anglo-American law is not very comprehensive,
importance for this country is to be attached to the author's study because depre-
ciation of the dollar in the face of the world wide use of dollar contracts will
presumably provoke similar controversies in the future.
The attitude of the German courts with regard to the pound depreciation has
vacillated. It is well known that after the complete breakdown of the former
German mark, mark creditors were granted a revalorization (Aufwcrtimg) by the
courts, the extent of which was to be determined arbitrarily, without definite criteria,
according to the circumstances of the case ("free revalorization" as contrasted with
'"statutory revalorization" which provides for definite percentages of the original
debt).' Originally revalorization was denied to contracts in foreign money, until
a judgment of the Reichsgericht, dated June 27, 1928, extended it to such contracts,
provided that the depreciation of the monetary unit had been a "catastrophic" one.2
This the court considered to have been true for the Austrian crown, devaluated
at about fourteen-thousandths, as opposed, for instance, to the French franc which
kept approximately one-fifth of its value. Thus sterling debts did not come within
the scope of revalorization. However, in a judgment of June 21, 1933, the
Reichsgericht took a surprising turn.3 A German spinning mill sold yams for sterling,
before the fall of the pound, to another German firm. The seller asserted that in
the making of the contract pounds had been chosen only because of their supposed
stability, and he brought suit against the buyer for the original gold value of the
pounds. The Reichsgericht did not assume that a tacit gold clause was involved
in the contract, nor did it grant the seller a "revalorization", but it admitted an
adjustment (Ausgleich) in accordance with the demands of good faith and the
special circumstances of the case.
Professor Lambert violently assails the judgment of the Reichsgericht. Indeed,
Aufwertung and Ausgleich are as alike as two peas, and many further objections
may properly be raised against the court's reasoning. But Professor Lambert's
method of argument can scarcely be appreciated. He approves of the Rcichsgericht's
revalorization doctrine including the distinction between "catastrophic" and "non-
catastrophic" depreciations. Free revalorization, however, rests completely on a
discretionary if not arbitrary power of the judge. One may point out that the
Reichsgericht, with respect to "non-catastrophic" depreciations (like that of the franc)
first denied, and then, under a new name, granted revalorization. But, if one re-
gards equity and free judicial discretion as the legal solution of the depreciation
problem, then it is, at best, a matter of sheer expediency to exclude from this
solution cases where creditors have lost "only" four-fifths of their debt. Such a
limitation is foreign to the logic of law and negates the very spirit of equity.
One cannot dodge in this instance the question of principle. Is the judiciary en-
abled, and called upon to solve the revaluation problem, or must it pass this task
along to the legislature? This problem may some dky be presented also to American
courts. In Germany free revaluation originated out of a conflict between the demo-
cratic government and the judiciary, which proved to be stronger. It brought
about countless abuses and unprecedented confusion, described by the reviewer in
Bilanz der Aufwertungstheorie. Professor Lambert's opinion overlooks the very
1. For an excellent history of the German revalorization judgments see Daw.-son, EBfesis
of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924 (1934) 33 Almxcm L. REv. 171.
2. JuRzmsrscm= WocH m:cHRirr (1928) 1197.
3. 141 Entscheidungen des Reidhsgerichts in Zivilsachen (1933) 212.
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serious failures of free revaluation 4 and it does not take into consideration the fact
that other countries, having doubtless experienced like Austria a "catastrophic"
depreciation of currency, denied free revaluation.
Moreover, the distinction between catastrophic and non-catastrophic depreciation
is arbitrary and impracticable. Professor Lambert is the first writer to advocate it.
The Reichsgericht itself did not always follow this distinction. Free revaluation
was granted by the Reclsgericht to mark creditors who had suffered loss by a de-
preciation absorbing no more than seventy-five and even less per cent.5 Thus in
practice the distinction is illogically confined to foreign money. But how is it to
be carried through within this sphere? Is, for instance, the depreciation of the
Roumanian Zen, which kept about three-fourths of one per cent of its original value,
catastrophic or non-catastrophic?
This objection raised by the reviewers is held "surprising" by Professor Lambert.
He points out that the distinction chosen by the Reichsgericht is less "elastic" than
the conduct of pater familias according to Roman law, or the rule of reasonableness
in Anglo-American law, or the distinction between use and abuse of rights. I think
these examples are non-comparable. Whether for instance a negotiable instrument,
payable on demand, has been presented within a "reasonable time"7 depends on
the nature of the instrument, the usages of trade or business, the distance of the
residence of the holder from the place of presentation, of what had been said be-
tween the issuer and the holder and of other facts of the particular case.8 The
decision, as to whether or not under numerous and various circumstances the time
taken for presentation was reasonable, can be found only in a reconstruction and
appreciation of the whole situation, necessarily tempered by a discretionary element.
But with regard to monetary depreciation the exclusively decisive criterion is the
degree of depreciation. It would be unacceptable to hold catastrophic a depreciation,
which reduced the value of the monetary unit of state A to three per cent, which
at the same time was held non-catastrophic for state B. Therefore, the partisans
of the Reichsgericht's doctrine are at a loss to find out a precise figure of demarcation.
Professor Lambert himself refrains from taking a definite position with regard to
Roumanian currency. He passes this thankless task to the courts, which are scarcely
better equipped for it than Professor Lambert.
On the other hand, Professor Lambert will meet general consent when he argues
that contracts made in foreign money do not imply a gold clause except where
the clause is contained in the contract either expressly or by the whole of its
provisions. There is an abundance of decisions to the same effect. But I do not
think that the Feist case,9 copiously discussed by Professor Lambert, is pertinent.
First, not a tacit but a very explicit gold clause was disputed in that case; secondly,
the bonds were to be paid in pounds sterling, issued in England, phrased as English
bonds, and wholly governed by English law, the only foreign element being that
the debtor was a Belgian company. This situation is thoroughly different from
that of a contract made in dollars between a Russian and a German party. Not
more pertinent, in my opinion, is Bronson v. Rodes, 0 likewise treated by the author.
Here, also, an express gold clause was presented to the Supreme Court, and its
compatibility with the monetary laws of the United States was the point of the
judgment. The question of a tacit gold clause has been dealt with in Thompson
4. This is indeed done also by Dawson, supra note 1.
S. NUSSBAum, BmAwz DER AuFwER'uxSTi0mEo (1928) 24.
6. jumsscn WocHrscnm- (1928) 1197.
7. NEo. INST. LAw, § 71. 8. Ibid., at § 193.
9. Feist v. Socdet6 Intercommunale Beige d'Electridt6, [1933] Ch. 684, [19341 A. C. 161.
10. 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. 1868).
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v. Riggs," and in Frothinglant v. Morse," restricted however to domestic (Amer-
ican) currency.' 3 Decisions emanating from other jurisdictions are also cited by
Professor Lambert.
The second part of the opinion concerns the question whether an arbitration court,
as instituted by the contracts of the Commercial Agency of the U. S. S. R., would
be entitled to grant the sterling creditors a revaluation or compensation. Professor
Lambert answers in the negative. He points out that the question at issue is one
of "social politics", "involving the future of the entire commerce of Germany and
the development of its international relationships." The solution of such a problem
should, in the opinion of the author, be left to the legislature, not to national courts
and even less to arbitrators who would have neither ability nor authority to deal
"in the name of Germany" with equally far-reaching problems of "politique juridique
gbzirale:' German arbitrators deciding an individual case never would speak in
the name of Germany. And in the granting or the denying of a compensation for
a depreciation of the contractual currency, they are clearly moving within the field
of law. There is no doubt about that, if one takes into account the Reiclisgerclt's
decision of June 21, 1933. It is a matter of course that any arbitrator, acting under
German law, would justifiably and probably follow the precedents of the highest
German court, even those criticized on serious grounds in legal literature. There
is an evident inconsistency in Professor Lambert's reasoning, for he approves of
free revaluation by both the courts and arbitrators, while as a matter of fact, free
revaluation as well as "compensation' is a question of "social politics" or "politique
juridique g~n~rale."
However, German authors generally indicate that arbitrators are not restricted to
legal reasoning, but may base the award on mere equity,14 but this latter doctrine
does not support the author's assertion. On the contrary, if arbitrators may decide
on principles of equity, they will not exceed their authority in distributing equitably
between the parties the loss resulting from the depreciation. In the case contem-
plated by Professor Lambert the arbitration agreement contained the provision that
the arbitrators had to make the award under German law. But it is not certain
that considerations of equity not in the corpus of German law are excluded thereby.
An esteemed German writer admits the interpretation that such a provision excludes
only the application of foreign (non German) law. 5 Be that right or wrong, the
whole controversy vital to the discussion carried on by the author has been over-
looked by him.
It was the reviewer's duty to express frankly his objections to the present opinion.
They do not diminish, however, the high esteem which he feels for Professor Lam-
bert's achievements in the field of comparative law.
New York City. Anraun NussnAm,.f
11. 5 Wail. 663 (U. S. 1867).
12. 45 N. H. 545 (1864).
13. See furthermore, for contracts made in the former Rssian currency, Timan v.
Russo-Asiatic Bank, 51 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931); Klochkov v. Petrogradi-d
Bank, 239 App. Div. 687, 268 N. Y. Supp. 433 (Ist Dep't, 1934).
14. See Smu Aim JoNAs, ZIVIPROZESSOMIMnGc (14th ed. 1929) 1034; 1 BAr...r,
DAs ScmmxsGr mcmcnE V Amprs2T (1931) 97.
15. BAuimBACH, supra note 14, at 97.
tVisiting Professor of Law, Columbia University.
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FIVE HUNDRED DELINQUENT WOmEN. By Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T. Glueck.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1934. pp. xxiv, 539, x.
DiscovERY in the social sciences lacks that dramatic quality characteristic of the
discovery of a new star or a new chemical element. Social and psychological facts
are usually familiar long before the careful investigator transforms familiarity into
precise knowledge; and the run of men is not especially thrilled to know clearly
what they have already dimly felt. Then too, there are deap-seated attitudes that
tend to make fact-knowledge of social processes unwelcome. The rationalistic and
sentimental formulas by means of which men habitually face their social problems
are generally resistent to the frequently disconcerting results of social inquiry. In
such an atmosphere we may expect that the social scientist will be accused either
of elaborating the obvious, or else of preaching untried and subversive doctrines.
The present study by Professor and Mrs. Glueck is an example of the modem,
scientific social investigation at its best. They have asked a multitude of familiar
questions about the careers of 500 delinquent women, and they have sought the
answers in definite and quantitative terms. Few of their results are surprising;
but all of them are important. They are important, not only because they are accurate
and essentially unarguable, but also because of their portentous bearing upon the
enterprise of social control. They clearly show the uselessness of the "moral" atti-
tude toward fallen women, even where that attitude is one of sentimental pity rather
than of scorn or hatred. The authors demonstrate by means of an avalanche of
facts the purely natural and comprehensible relationships between given combinations
of biological, psychological, and social circumstances and resulting delinquency.
Professor and Mrs. Glueck do not conclude that our present procedures are utterly
hopeless. Women incarcerated for a year and a half in the Massachusetts Reform-
atory for Women show some improvement during the succeeding period of parole
and supervision; and during the next five years they do not slip back to the average
level of maladjustment prior to incarceration. But considering the total careers of
these women, they are a sorry lot. Reeducation in the Reformatory must surmount
a terrible obstacle in that the women's personalities have been warped since child-
hood and therapy begins too late. Gains that actually are achieved by the Reform-
atory are difficult to hold because of the unpropitious environments to which the
released inmates must be returned. It is little wonder that dull and unstable young
women fail to appreciate the bargain when they are offered house work at $7 a
week as a substitute for fast living.
All but two per cent of these women had been sexually irregular prior to incar-
ceration, which clearly shows why the public has so persistently identified such
delinquents simply with the problem of prostitution. But the very complete data
of the present study show how inadequate was the earlier conclusion that sexual
irregularity is brought about through ignorance of moral precepts. "The biological
and social heritage of sexual offenders is essentially similar to that of other delin-
quents; female wrongdoers, regardless of their crimes, have much the same sordid
background of unfortunate heredity, mental abnormality, ignorant and vicious par-
entage, underprivileged childhood, and like evils."
The ultimate and inescapable conclusion from this study is that social control
in the area here represented must be largely ineffective until public attention is
focused upon those deficiencies of community life out of which delinquency arises.
One is forced to admit that much in the way of cultural inertia must be overcome
before society will turn aside from the relief it has obtained by moral gestures and
face seriously the issues here involved. In the meantime able workers, like the
authors of this book, will go on collecting and presenting factual evidence with the
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assurance that, though this type of persuasion is slow, there can be no genuine
doubt about its final result in the realm of social responsibility and action.
New Haven, Connecticut. EDIWum S. ROBINsoN.t
RESTATEMENT Op THE LAW OF TORTS. St. Paul: American Law Institute Pub-
lishers. 1934. Vol. 1, pp. xxxii, 730. Vol. 2, pp. xxxi, 731-1338.
TiESE two volumes contain those portions of the Restatement of the Law of
Torts which were approved at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute
at Washington, D. C., on May 10-12, 1934, and, as we learn from the introduction
to Volume I, are to be followed later by two or three additional volumes com-
pleting the treatment of torts.
The Reporter selected for the restatement of the law on this subject was Pro-
fessor Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, who has long been
recognized as a leading authority on the subject. The entire treatise bears his
impress, not only in the terminology with which, by his writings, he has done much
to familiarize at least the teachers, but also by the doctrines embodied in the
treatise relating to matters upon which there is a conflict of authority. To him,
therefore, is due the major portion of responsibility and credit for the work in its
final form. The contributions of the Advisers, however, as we learn not only from
the introduction but also from reports hitherto submitted at the annual meetings
of the Institute and elsewhere have been by no means nominal
The first characteristic of the Restatement that attracts the attention of the reader
is the terminology employed. The first chapter contains a series of definitions of
terms used throughout the work, many of these terms not having hitherto been
customarily used by the courts with reference to the law of torts, either at all or
in the sense in which they are employed in the Restatement. For example the word
"interest" as defined indicates "the object of any human desire." Again the word
"privilege" is defined as denoting "the fact that conduct which, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, would subject the actor to liability, under particular circumstances, doas
not subject him thereto." This latter is another way of conveying the idea tradi-
tionally expressed by the term "defense." "Battery" is no longer "an unlawful
touching of the person of another" but under the new terminology is "An act which
directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person."
To one who takes the time to master the definition of new terms and their appli-
cation throughout various portions of the Restatement, the sections in which they
are used will be intelligible, but to the lawyer who has not thus taken the time to
familiarize himself with the new terminology it will constitute an obstacle to his
understanding of, and a deterrent to his use of, the Restatement. The extent to
which this innovation may interfere with the use and application of the Restatement
in the briefs and arguments of lawyers and in the opinions of the courts, time alone
will reveal.
At earlier stages of the preparation of the Restatement of Torts, tentative drafts
of text and comments were accompanied or followed by pamphlets, "Commentaries,"
containing citation of cases and other authorities supporting propositions in the text,
and in some instances also citing authorities contra, thus assisting the reader in
forming an independent judgment as to the extent to which the text embodied the
existing law. The final draft now published is not accompanied by a republication
of these commentaries, the idea being apparently that the final draft is to be ac-
tProfessor of Psychology, Yale University. Associate, Yale School of Law.
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cepted as a definitive statement of the law, and authorities in conflict therewith,
no matter how numerous or how long accepted and applied, are to be treated as
erroneous and therefore disregarded. The omission of these commentaries, however,
must be regarded by the average reader as unfortunate and calculated to arouse
some distrust with the conclusions reached in the text. Lawyers and judges are
so familiar with the practice in text books and cyclopedias, of looking down from
propositions in the text to foot-notes citing authorities supporting them, as to
hesitate to accept text statements without the citation of supporting authorities.
The text of the Restatement represents a high order of scholarship as to both
substance and style. It is evidently based upon extensive research and contains a
comprehensive statement of the rules of law approved and applicable to the subjects
covered. At times the style seems to lack elegance, but this is justified in the effort
to achieve an exactness of statement that cannot be misunderstood. However one
may disagree as to the soundness of the rules stated, there is little room for dis-
agreement as to the meaning of the text.
There has been no effort to evade pronouncement upon questions of difficulty or
upon which there is a conflict of authority. In fact one of the good results that
may confidently be anticipated from the publication of the Restatement is the focus-
ing of attention upon controversial matters, thus challenging criticisms from opponents
of the doctrines embodied in the text. It is impossible for any man or body of
men, no matter how learned and wise, to prepare a comprehensive treatise on the
law of torts that will meet with universal assent as to what the law is or should
be, but it is beyond the scope of this review to indulge in detailed criticisms of
the propositions approved by the Restatement.
Every reasonable effort has been made to acquaint the profession with the Re-
statements in general, including that of the law of torts, not only by the wide
distribution of the successive drafts and their discussion at meetings of bar asso-
ciations, meetings of the Association of American Law Schools and at annual meetings
of the Institute, but particularly by efforts to attract the favorable consideration
of the judiciary. This has been done by the appointment of judges as advisers and
by generous appropriations for the payment of their expenses to the annual meet-
ings of the Institute at Washington, which is but a frank recognition of the fact
that the judges rather than the text-writers still make the law; and it seems reason-
able to anticipate that members of the judiciary thus honored will acquire familiarity
with the doctrines of the Restatement and will be stimulated to gracious citation
and approval .of its text.
One of the greatest services that may reasonably be anticipated from the Restate-
ment is the influence to be exercised by it in the development of a national juris-
prudence. It seems probable, however, that progress toward this consummation so
greatly to be desired is more likely to be influenced by promotion of a basic phil-
osophy of the law, such as that of the sociological school of jurisprudence, rather
than by efforts to secure the sanction of specific rules. For example, the rule
established upon grave consideration in the English courts and in many American
jurisdictions to the effect that a person guilty of negligence is liable for all the
damages resulting therefrom in an unbroken chain of causation, whether he could
have foreseen them or not, is not likely to be abandoned, in the jurisdictions in
which it now prevails, because of disapproval in Section 281 of the Restatement,
the more especially since such abandonment may well be considered socially unde-
sirable.
Recent reaffirmations by the courts of last resort in New York1 and Ohiob 2 of
1. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931), per Cardozo, C. J.
2. Berkowitz v. Winston, 128 Ohio St. 611 (1934).
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the old rule (repudiated by Section 357 of the Restatement) that a lessor is not
liable in tort to a lessee, or to persons on the premises with the lessee's consent,
for personal injuries sustained by reason of a dangerous condition of the premises
arising after delivery of possession, although the lessor has covenanted to repair
and has been notified of the dangerous condition, may be taken as a fair indication
of the tendency of the courts to adhere to doctrines long established in their re-
spective jurisdictions, notwithstanding their disapproval by the Restatement.
Cleveland, Ohio. ARcHBAL H. THmoc onToN.t
CONsTITuTIoNAL LAW oF ENrLAND. By Edward Wavell Ridges. Fifth edition,
edited by A. B'erriedale Keith. London: Stevens and Sons, Limited. 1934.
pp. xlviii, 672.
THis new edition of an old and valuable textbook meets a real need. The de-
scription of the modem organs of the government, executive, legislative, and judicial,
as they exist under contemporary conditions, is admirably done. As would be
expected from the interests of the present editor, Professor Keith, the volume con-
tains a clear and authoritative discussion of the present organization of the empire,
which is not the least significant section of the work.
Combined with this picture of the modem state, there is, as in the older editions,
a survey of the historical origins of the various instruments of government, which
has also been radically modified in order to incorporate the latest results of research.
Herein the editor exhibits wide knowledge of his theme, as his footnotes and the
textual modifications demonstrate. So many additions to our knowledge of the
constitution have been made during the past generation, however, that it would
have been better to have rewritten the historical parts entirely, rather than to
endeavor to remodel them. The result of the combination is not always happy,
and sometimes gives rise to confusion and inaccuracy. Thus, the statements about
the Curia Regis, the Witenagemot, and the Great Council lack clarity. The Com-
mune Concilium, in article 12 of the Great Charter, is called parliament. 'Haxey's
Case" would hardly be cited today in tracing the evolution of free speech in the
House of Commons. The law merchant is not placed in its proper setting in the
history of the medieval period; one would gather that it was of little or no im-
portance in the history of the law, and this conclusion is probably due to the fact
that the text is primarily concerned with the growth of the royal courts. While
the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest is derived from ancient customs
connected with the Witan, the Curia Regis and the early parliament, there are vital
distinctions between them and the principles that were at issue in the 16th and
17th centuries, which are not developed.
Certain underlying theories in the volume do not seem to be quite in harmony
with contemporary views. Great emphasis is justly laid upon the "rule of law,"
as Dicey has developed it. Not sufficient care has been exercised, however, to
explain how the recent growth in complexity and in power of the administrative
system has profoundly modified the application of Dicey's conclusions to current
governmental practice. It also seems unhistorical to suggest that the notion of the
rule of law reaches far back into medieval times as a characteristic of the English
government, in contrast with continental states. The distinctive features of English
practice in this respect only developed in the 16th and 17th centuries when the app~al
to custom and to the courts began to protect individual liberty and to exercise a
tProfessor of Law, Western Reserve University.
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check upon the new national organization far more in England than on the continent.
Every one knows that the Tudor and Stuart periods form an age of fundamental
constitutional interpretation. In the great dispute under the Stuarts, both parties
(king and parliament) bolstered their cases with appeals to precedent; in this, says
George Burton Adams, it must be admitted that history was on the side of the king
rather than of parliament. But parliament won and became the legal sovereign.
Later writers, influenced by emotions aroused by the conflict, often declared that
the contentions of the royal party were "illegal" and "unconstitutional"; as indeed
they were in the 18th century, but not earlier. Now the tone of the volume in
the historical parts often suggests this conventional attitude of an earlier day. Com-
bined with the persistence of these old emotions, is the concept that law is unchang-
ing, and hence that what is now unconstitutional has always been so. This tone
is in part also due to the effort to retain the original text of this able work. Is
not all this evidence that we need more study of constitutional, and above all of
legal history?
New Haven, Connecticut. SYDNE-Y K. MITCHILL,,
THE THEORY AND PRACTicE oF MODERN TAXATIox. By William Raymond Green.
Chicago: Commerce Clearing House. 1933. pp. vii, 266.
The author of this book is in a position to speak from a wide experience in tax
matters. Before being appointed to his present position as Judge of the United
States Court of Claims he served as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee
of the House of Representatives, and Chairman of the Joint Committee of the House
and Senate on Taxation. A reading of the book leaves one disappointed that Judge
Green did not delve more deeply into his subject in order that we might have the
benefit of his experience with the more intricate and difficult problems of tax ad-
ministration.
The book is a very general summary, pleasingly written, of the principal forms of
modern taxation, prefaced by an exceedingly brief discussion (eleven pages) of the
tax theories of some of the leading economists. After devoting four pages to a con-
sideration of the incidence of taxation, the author treats of income taxes, profits
taxes, customs duties, sales taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, occupation taxes and
capital levies. In addition, he finds space for chapters on the British system of taxa-
tion, the French system of taxation, and state taxation in the United States. All
in two hundred and fifty pages! The author probably never intended the book to
be anything more than a panorama painted in very bold strokes, and that is all it is.
P. W. B.
tProfessor of History, Yale University.
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